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Recent literature suggests that stock market liberalisation has positive effects on
macroeconomic growth and private investment.  However, econometric relations are largely
dependent on the inclusion of higher income countries in such samples, which quite
conceivably limits the relevance for lower income nations.  Indeed, some evidence in this
study indicates that stock market development has a more positive impact on growth for
greater levels of per capita GDP.  Similarly, lagged equity price appreciation seems to boost
private investment growth, but only in rich countries.  Curiously, neither financial nor legal
development variables, which are more serviceably relevant than initial income, seem to be
mitigating factors, but these data imply subdued enthusiasm regarding emerging equity
market development.
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1.  Introduction
Recent literature argues that lower income countries should liberalise their stock
markets.  This paper examines both the short- and long-term transmission mechanisms that
support this component of capital account reform.  The long-run view (Levine and Zervos,
1998a, 1998b) argues that reform advances overall stock market development, which in turn
enhances macroeconomic growth.  The short-run view suggests that reform produces a one-
time increase in stock prices, which in turn boosts private investment given the (purported)
decrease in the equity cost of capital (Henry, 2000a, 2000b).
This paper re-examines the final phases of both of these causal paths.  First,
considering the long-run, several factors recommend re-examining the empirical link between
stock market development measures and macroeconomic growth.  For example, previous
studies that produce positive results only include data before 1994, notably before the
‘Tequila crisis’ and ‘Asian flu’, which afflicted lower income countries with comparatively
advanced equity markets.  But more germane to financial theory, previous econometric
evidence includes higher income countries samples that produce positive relations, and a
growing literature suggests that what determines expansion differs across national income
levels.  Therefore, this study tests whether the positive correlation is robust in samples of
exclusively emerging markets.  Simply, if the relation between stock markets and growth is
confined to higher income countries, the long-run perspective on stock market liberalisation
would seem less applicable to poorer countries.
Second, with respect to the final phase of the short-run mechanism, this paper tests
how private investment responds to changes in stock market valuation in both higher and
lower income markets.  While most research on Tobin’s q and related mechanisms focuses on
developed markets, particularly the United States (Barro, 1990), there is a dearth of evidence
on emerging markets, especially the lower income countries.  Also, similar to the relationQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS53 Page 3
between stock market development and growth, this study examines the notion that the
association between valuation changes and investment is more pronounced in higher income
cases.  Besides the questionable relation between liberalisation and stock market prices
(Durham, 2000b), if the elasticity between valuation and investment is less salient or even
non-existent in lower income countries, the short-run mechanism would also seem less
persuasive for developing areas.
Section 2 outlines previous literature and econometric results, and Section 3 explains
the motivation for re-examining the apparent positive empirical links between stock market
development and growth in the long-run and between equity valuation and private investment
in the short-run.  Section 4 presents the results regarding long run growth, and Section 5
presents the results for private investment.  Section 6 concludes.
2.  Previous Literature
Considerable literature addresses the general merits of open capital accounts, with
respect to foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio investment (FPI), and bank lending
(FBL).  Given the focus on stock market behaviour and the real economy, this paper more
specifically addresses sanguine perspectives on equity FPI.  In his general overview of
proposals for reducing ‘global financial instability’, Rogoff (1999) recommends a substantial
shift from debt to equity finance.  Briefly, he argues that equity finance introduces risk
sharing, via reductions in moral hazard with ownership, as well as more efficient resource
allocation, via (share) price signalling.  The benevolent perspectives on stock market
liberalisation and development, to which the discussion now turns, are of course specific
manifestations of this broad view.
2.1.  The Long-run: The Effect of Stock Market Development on GrowthQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS53 Page 4
The first strand of literature focuses on (long-term) stock market development.
Levine and Zervos (1998b) outline a benevolent mechanism from liberalisation through
overall stock market development to the real economy.  Briefly, they find that liberalisation
tends to increase various measures of stock market development, including market
capitalisation to GDP and liquidity (measured by the total valued traded to GDP or,
alternatively, to total market capitalisation).  Citing a separate inquiry (Levine and Zervos,
1998a), equity market development, in particular market liquidity, is in turn a robust
determinant of macroeconomic growth using a sample of up to approximately 70 higher and
lower income countries from 1976 to 1993.  Therefore, this benevolent long-run indirect
mechanism from reform to the real economy follows:
(1)
Liberalisation StockMarketDevelopment Growth ⇒↑ ⇒↑ .
Notably, samples that produce positive empirical relations between stock market
development indicators and economic growth include developed countries.  Even augmented
analyses that include cases in which stock market activity is ‘inconsequential’ (Levine and
Zervos, 1998a, p. 553) still use information from OECD countries to produce robust
estimates.  Therefore, (1) is not based on evidence from exclusive MIC or LIC samples, and
Section 3 outlines the controversy surrounding this methodology in greater detail.
2.2.  The Short-run: Reform, Valuation Changes, and Private Investment
The second issue focuses on short-term indirect dynamics.  Briefly, Henry (2000a)
documents temporary increases in private investment growth rates among a sample of 11
developing countries
1 that liberalised their stock markets during the 1977 to 1994 period.  He
                                                       
1 These include Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, India, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, Thailand,
and Venezuela.  He finds that in the first, second, and third years after liberalisation, 9, 10 and 8 of the 11
sample countries, respectively, had growth rates of private investment above their non-liberalisation medians.
He reports that rates return to their pre-liberalisation by the fourth year after reform.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS53 Page 5
argues that stock market liberalisation in general lowers the cost of capital, k, and therefore
increases aggregate stock prices in emerging markets.
2  Given the decrease in k and holding
expected cash flows constant, some investment projects with negative net present values
(NAVs) before liberalisation exhibit positive NPVs afterwards, which induces increased
private investment.
3  Therefore, the short-run benevolent mechanism from flows through the
stock market to the real economy follows:
(2)
Liberalisation k Aggregate ices ivateInvestment ⇒↓ ⇒↑ ⇒↑ Pr Pr .
Some (Durham, 2000b) argue that the first link between reform and valuation is
econometrically fragile.  But this paper focuses on the final phase, which is critical, as Henry
argues that ‘the ultimate validity of this theory requires the existence of an intermediate
empirical link from stock prices to investment’ (p. 20).  While previous literature (Barro,
1990) documents a positive relation between stock market returns and private investment,
Henry documents a similarly ‘strong correlation’, particularly stock price appreciation
associated with liberalisation.
2.3.  A Caveat: Recent Developments in the Literature on External Finance
While the debate on stock market liberalisation focuses on cross-border (equity)
flows, the transmission mechanisms in (1) and (2) also draw on a related literature on
                                                       
2 One can easily deduce the effect of decreased k on aggregate prices from the standard Gordon growth model of







where D refers to dividends, k is the cost of capital (composed of the risk-free rate and the equity risk premium),
and g is the expected growth rate of dividends.  All else equal (most contentiously g in the case of
liberalisation), a decrease in k produces an increase in P.
3 The cost of equity capital is related to local market volatility (variance) in closed capital markets.  In open
markets, the cost of capital is related to the covariance with world market returns.  Theory suggests that if the
covariance is less than the (domestic) variance, then the cost of equity capital should decrease after
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alternative forms of external finance, either domestic or international.  A more thorough
discussions of these perspectives can be found elsewhere (Levine and Zervos, 1998a; Levine,
2000; Beck and Levine, 2000).  But a very brief outline of the differences between the ‘bank-
based’, the (stock) ‘market-based’, the ‘financial services’, and the ‘legal-based’ views of
financial development and macroeconomic growth are instructive at this juncture.
The bank-based view stresses the effectiveness with which banks provide external
finance and fund new firms, particularly with respect to close, long-term relationships
between creditors and debtors.  The (stock) markets-based view both emphasises how equity
markets fund new, innovative enterprises and the comparative advantages of markets with
respect to banks.  In particular, deep and liquid stock markets enable market participants to
quickly acquire information regarding productive enterprises and to more effectively tie
managerial compensation with performance (via acquisitions).
The financial services view suggests that both banks and markets arise to limit
transaction and information costs, and the critical issue is the quality and availability of these
financial services and not whether bank or markets provide them.  Finally, the legal-based
view argues that countries that establish and enforce legal codes that protect property rights
will develop financial systems that facilitate external finance for existing and nascent firms.
The relevance of these general perspectives for this study is that a robust correlation
between, say, stock market liquidity and growth supports both the market-based and financial
services views.  That is, one could more broadly restate (1) and suggest that stock market
liberalisation increases growth through general financial system development, rather than
exclusively espouse the market-based view.  Importantly, while these distinct perspectives
usefully characterise a burgeoning literature, such taxonomy should not unduly cloud the
policy debate.  Quite conceivably, perhaps transparent and efficient banks, stock markets, andQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS53 Page 7
legal systems are all unproblematic and self-recommending.  Indeed, the following analysis
examines interaction terms that capture the contingent relations between these factors.
3.  Motivation for Re-examining the relation between stock markets and growth
Questions remain regarding the applicability of previous evidence that stock market
development promotes growth in lower income countries (Levine and Zervos, 1998a, 1998b)
and that investment responds positively to equity price appreciation (Henry, 2000a, 2000b).
Therefore, this issue address general notion that equity investment is a benevolent alternative
(Rogoff, 1999).  These issues concern temporal out-of-sample tests, conflicting evidence on
growth across higher and lower income countries, and, perhaps most important, key
differences between developed and emerging stock markets.
3.1.  Temporal Out-of-sample Tests
A simple reason to re-examine the apparent correlation regards the recent experience
of the mid- to late-1990s, including the Tequila Crisis and Asian flu.  Notably, pervious
evidence on long-run growth uses data through 1993 (Levine and Zervos, 1996, 1998a), and
figures for studies on private investment (Henry 2000a, 2000b) end in 1994.  Indeed,
countries that experienced a crisis in general possessed greater levels of stock market
development and indeed greater financial openness in general compared to other lower
income countries.  Countries that experienced crises during the 1990s generally had turnover
ratios that were greater than the mean value (20.25 percent) for other emerging markets in
1989 – including Mexico (33.35 percent), Thailand (78.47 percent), Indonesia (38.65
percent), the Philippines (29.07 percent) and Malaysia (21.84 percent).  Therefore, perhaps
previous results are susceptible to temporal sample bias.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS53 Page 8
3.2. Sample Divisions across National Income
Perhaps the most general reason to examine this empirical question anew regards the
widely observed phenomenon that growth regressions seem to explain considerable more
variance in developed as opposed to lower income samples.  For example, Grier and Tullock
(1989) clearly find that models that exclusively consider lower income countries explain
considerably less variance than regressions that include OECD countries.
Some argue that the growth process fundamentally differs across developed and less
developed areas, and even sub-divisions of non-OECD countries produce distinct results.  For
example, Gerschenkron (1962) perhaps seminally argued that the rate of economic
development should differ considerably across initial income.  More recently, with respect to
cross-border flows, most studies do not indicate that FDI has an unambiguously positive
impact on growth.  Rather, recipient countries must exhibit satisfactory ‘absorptive capacity’
with respect to initial GDP (Blomström et al., 1992) or human capital development
(Borensztein et al., 1998).  Beyond financial and monetary economics, some studies also
suggest that the appropriate political and constitutional environment might differ with initial
income.  Perhaps germane to the legal-based view, Durham (1999) argues that the
effectiveness of certain political regimes should differ with the initial level of development,
and indeed, some data suggest that the effect of regime type differs in lower income
countries.  Therefore, given the general suspicion that growth determinants differ with initial
income, that previous evidence includes information from the highest income cases raises
questions.
3.3.  Alternative Characteristics of Equity Markets across High and Low Income Countries
More specific to this particular research inquiry, another reason to question studies
that use data from developed markets is that the framework for the ‘banks versus markets’QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS53 Page 9
debate derives largely from developed (OECD) country experience.  Notably, prototypical
‘bank based’ systems refer to Germany and Japan, where as ‘market based’ systems refer to
the United States and Great Britain (Levine and Zervos, 1998a; Levine, 2000).  This literature
contrasts considerably with, say, the debate between import substitution and export
promotion industrialisation.  However useful this literature on broad development strategies,
the evidence and discussion directly refers to contemporary, or at least post-1945
development history.  In contrast, the financial development literature addresses ‘a century
old policy debate’ (Levine, 2000).
Fundamental issues related to market activity highlight this omission.  For example,
some literature suggests that developed and emerging stock markets differ with respect to
both microstructure as well as asset pricing.  In fact, Green et al. (2000) suggest that
developed and emerging markets have different trading systems, as trading in higher income
countries tend to be ‘demand driven,’ while lower income countries ‘have adopted new
trading systems in anticipation for growth (p. 46).
Also, the empirical literature on asset pricing suggests that different variables drive
developed and emerging market performance, even though both developed and emerging
markets show evidence of predictable and lepkurtostic returns as well as volatility clustering
(Green et al., 2000).  Very generally, beyond exclusive examination of price history, Harvey
(1995) finds that local information is less likely to influence returns in developed markets,
where global information is more relevant.  Also, Durham (2000a) finds that stock market
anomalies are generally more robust in emerging markets, which supports the view that
bourses in developed markets are more efficient.  This evidence implies that equity markets
less effectively distribute information and signal productive enterprises in lower income
countries.  Therefore, one might conjecture that bourses in poorer countries simply exhibit
fewer growth-enhancing characteristics, and therefore liberalisation should proceedQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS53 Page 10
cautiously.  But whatever the case, exclusive examination of emerging markets would seem
to be a sensible and relatively cost-less econometric exercise.
4.  Data and Econometric Results: Stock Market Development and Growth
Data on stock market development indicators are somewhat limited, as this study
covers the 1981 to 1998 period.
4  The analyses include as many cases as possible and follow
two conventions on which countries to include.  The first is to include cases for which there is
(non -zero) data on stock market development indicators.
5  The second, following Levine and
Zervos (1998a) is to also include data on countries with ‘inconsequential’ or nascent stock
markets, which are arguably particularly noteworthy, and assign zero to all indicators.
6
Of course, stock market development and general financial activity are not the only
determinants of economic expansion.  Therefore, following Levine and Renelt (1992), this
study controls for the four ‘base’ growth regressors, including initial per capita GDP, the
investment ratio, population growth, and the male education rate.  In addition, following
                                                       
4 The convention in the literature is to work with unbalanced panels, given the general dearth of data.
Apparently, Levine and Zervos (1996) consider averaging periods of unequal length in their panel, as the
averaging periods are 1976 to 1985 (10 years) and 1986 to 1993 (8 years).  Alternatively, this study uses
averaging periods of equal length.  The regressions in Levine and Zervos (1998a) are pure cross-sectional
designs that cover 1976 through 1993.  In most cases, they measure stock market development indicators at the
beginning of the sample (1976).  But clearly, some of these data are only available after 1976 (including total
value traded data for Japan, for example, which begins in 1980).  In contrast, this study only uses data for the
actual year observed.
5 Cases include (with number of averaging period observations in parentheses) Greece (2), India (2), Indonesia
(2), Israel (2), Italy (2), Jamaica (2), Japan (2), Jordan (2), Korea (2), Malaysia (2), Mexico (2), Netherlands (2),
Norway (2), Pakistan (1), Peru (1), Philippines (2), Portugal (2), Singapore (2), South Africa (2), Spain (2),
Sweden (2), Thailand (1), Trinidad and Tobago (1), Tunisia (1), United Kingdom (2), United States (2),
Venezuela (2), and Zimbabwe (2).  This produces 74 observations for the 9-year averaging panel regressions.
6 Inclusion of ‘inconsequential’ stock markets following Levine and Zervos (1998a) extends the observations for
the 9-year averaging panel to 117.  These additional 43 observations include data on  Bolivia (2), Botswana (2),
Cameroon (2), Central African Republic (2), Congo (Democratic Republic) (2), Costa Rica (2), Dominican
Republic (2), Ecuador (2), Ghana (2), Guyana (1), Haiti (1), Kenya (2), Lesotho (2), Malawi (2), Mauritius (2),
Nicaragua (1), Niger (2), Paraguay (2), Rwanda (2), Senegal (2), Sri Lanka (1), Uruguay (2), Zambia (2), and
Tunisia (1).  Levine and Zervos (1998a) enter zero for all development indicators for 1976 for these cases.
However, given the panel designs,  this study uses non-zero data if available for any initial period.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS53 Page 11
Levine and Zervos (1998a), all regressions include domestic credit provided by the banking
sector divided by GDP.
7
4.1. The Complete Sample and Divisions across initial GDP per capita
The most straightforward way to examine whether developed markets drive the
overall result is to divide the sample across levels of initial income.  Considering resulting
losses in degrees of freedom, which might singularly drive insignificant results, the analysis
includes alternative panel designs with 6- and 3-year averaging periods in addition to the
more conventional 9-year panel.
The long-run (9-year averaging period) data, which mostly closely resembles previous
evidence on long-run effects, seem to indicate that inclusion of developed countries in the
sample drives the overall correlation between stock market turnover and growth.  More
specifically, as Table 1 indicates, the long-run equations that include all possible cases
indicate a positive correlation between liquidity and long-run growth.  The equation that
includes ‘inconsequential’ development cases (Regression 1.2) produces the more robust
result, with a greater coefficient (0.031) and lower p value (0.007).  In general, these results
suggest that recent data that extend through 1998 do not vitiate previous findings (Levine and
Zervos, 1996, 1998a).
Inclusion of only high-income countries, which reduces the sample to 37
observations, still produces a robust result safely within the 1 percent confidence interval
(Regression 1.3), even given the considerable reduction in degrees of freedom.  However, the
two regressions without (Regression 1.4) and with (Regression 1.5) non-existent stock
markets that include only lower income countries produce positive but statistically
insignificant coefficients (p values = 0.704 and 0.169, respectively).  Thus, these sample
                                                       
7 Data on stock market turnover come from either the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI)
(2000) or the IFC’s Emerging Stock Markets Factbook, various issues.  Data on all ‘base’ control variablesQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS53 Page 12
divisions of long-run data, which conforms most closely to previous literature, imply that
stock market development promotes expansion in developed, but not in lower income
countries.
Again, given general data limitations regarding this empirical question, the analysis
includes alternative panel averaging periods.  Turning to the medium-run (6-year averaging
period) regressions, the comprehensive samples covering high- and low-income countries
indicate a positive impact, both including and excluding nascent stock markets (Regressions
2.1 and 2.2).  However, the sample of exclusively developed cases (Regression 2.3) does not
produce a statistically significant coefficient (p value = 0.165), however positive.  Moreover,
some data on lower income countries actually suggest that stock market development
enhances growth in the medium-run, at least using the sample that includes nascent bourses
(Regression 2.5).  As a whole, unlike the 9-year averaging period, these medium-run
regressions suggest that lower income countries possibly drive the overall result.
Finally, short-run (3-year averaging period) regressions seem to corroborate the
perspective that stock market development is universally beneficial.  All regressions
(Regressions 3.1 through 3.5), the complete sample and every division thereof, produce a
positive a statistically significant estimate for turnover.  However, this averaging period is the
least conventional, as market capitalisation changes might capture growth expectations over
shorter future horizons, and 3-year periods might not sufficiently net out business cycle
fluctuations.
4.2.  Interaction with Initial GDP per capita and Country Risk
Division of the sample is ultimately somewhat arbitrary.  Therefore, the remainder of
the section examines whether there are more systematic ways to isolate the (contingent)
                                                                                                                                                                           
come from the WDI except male education rates, which come from Barro and Lee (2000).QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS53 Page 13
relation between the effect of stock market development on growth and the initial level of
income.  One method to determine a precise relation is to include an additional term to
capture the interaction between income and liquidity, as in
 (3)
Economic Growth = α  + β 1LIQUIDITY + β 2[ln(LIQUIDITY× GDP] + β 3X + µ
This form permits a number of possibilities.  For example, if only β 2 > 0, then stock market
development only has a significant effect on growth through its interaction with initial
income.  For a given level of stock market development, the effect is more benevolent for
higher income cases.  If β 1 > 0 and β 2 > 0, the liquidity has an unambiguously positive effect
on growth, but the interaction term would still imply that stock markets have a more
pronounced effect in higher income countries.  Finally, if β 1 < 0 and β 2 > 0, then there is a
‘threshold’ of initial income below which stock market development is actually deleterious to
growth.
8
Turning to the results, Table 2 outlines regression results for (3) on the three
alternative panel designs and averaging periods, and in general, the results are highly
sensitive to whether the ‘inconsequential’ cases are included in the sample.  In fact,
regressions that include as many cases as possible – whether in the long-, medium-, or short-
run (Regressions 4.2, 4.4, and 4.6) – all produce positive and statistically significant
interaction terms between liquidity and initial income.  These particular results imply that
                                                       
8 This expression implies a non-constant threshold that depends on the level of the initial flow, and the ratio of
β 1 to β 2 indicates how quickly the requisite initial level of income increases for an increase in capital flow. The
‘break-even’ initial level of development followsQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS53 Page 14
stock market development unambiguously enhances growth, but all things equal, the effect is
more pronounced for higher income countries.
More specifically, the long-run data suggest that only the interaction term is
significant within the 10 percent confidence interval for the sample that includes nascent
cases (Regression 4.2).  All relevant coefficients are positive but insignificant in the
remaining long-run model (Regression 4.1).  The medium-run data produce a similar result,
as again, only the equation (Regression 4.4) that includes all possible cases produces a
statistically significant positive estimate for the interaction term.
The short-run regression (Regression 4.5) that excludes the non-existent cases
suggests that liquidity has a positive and significant effect on growth, while the interaction
term is insignificant (but positive).  Inclusion of all cases suggests that both liquidity and the
interaction term are safely positive and significant (Regression 4.6).
While these results are noteworthy, initial national income could proxy for a number
of disparate factors.  In other words, what aspect of higher income economies seems to affect
the salience of the effect of stock market development on growth?  Table 2B examines (3) but
substitutes the Institutional Investor country credit rating for per capita GDP.  This measure
captures investors’ perception of general investment risk for a given country.
Indeed, some results suggest that the benevolent effect of stock market liquidity is
contingent upon country risk.  The coefficients for liquidity are positive in all six regressions,
but none are statistically significant.  In contrast, all equations (Regressions 5.2, 5.4, and 5.6)
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that include inconsequential cases produce positive and statistically significant estimates for
the interaction term, but the remaining regressions produce insignificant estimates.  These
results imply that stock market development enhances growth more for cases with favourable
credit ratings, which are notably less likely to be lower income countries.
4.3.  Interaction with Legal Variables
Given that initial GDP and country credit ratings capture a variety of underlying
variables, significant results do not have much applicability with respect to specific policy
proscriptions.  International financial institutions and development agencies can hardly
suggest that lower income countries suddenly increase initial income or improve perceived
credit risk.
Therefore, this section alternatively substitutes nine legal based variables in (3) to
estimate β 2.  These measures, while still somewhat crude, are nonetheless more serviceable
compared to initial income and abstract country risk.  These include indices for creditor legal
codes; enforcement of such legal codes; accounting and company report standards; a
composite measure of creditor, enforcement, and accounting standards; rule of law;
expropriation risk; bureaucracy efficiency; business regulation; and property rights.  Again,
the analyses include six regressions for each variable, considering the sample and panel
averaging period alternatives.
9
These results summarised in Table 2C generally support the findings in the previous
section, but β 1 and β 2 are significant in the majority of regressions.  For example, among the
54 regressions that consider legal variables, only the nine-year model that excludes nascent
stock markets produces a statistically significant result for liquidity (β 1).  This model suggests
                                                       
9 These measures are from Levine (2000) and are unfortunately temporally inert averages over the 1982 to 1995
period.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS53 Page 16
that turnover actually has a negative effect on growth, at least within the 10 percent
confidence interval (p value = 0.087).
Furthermore, with respect to β 2, nine of the 54 models produce statistically significant
interaction terms with the expected positive sign within the 10 percent confidence interval.
Four of the six models that include creditor produce significant results, as the 6- and 3-year
averaging period models that exclude nascent equity markets produce insignificant estimates.
Also, both 9-year panels that include the index for bureaucratic efficiency produce significant
results, and the 9-year models that exclude nascent cases and include measures of the rule of
law, expropriation risk, and enforcement are similarly robust.  In general, these results do not
support any particular ‘competing’ perspective among the four general views on finance and
growth.  Rather, a significant and positive interaction terms suggest that financial and legal
development both enhance growth.
But conclusions should not run too far afield.  For example, the 6-year model that
excludes ‘inconsequential cases’ and includes the composite legal measure (the first principal
components of creditor, enforcement, and accounting standards) curiously produces a
negative interaction term.  Also, 44 of the 54 models produce insignificant results for
interaction terms, and these include every model that incorporates company reports and
accounting standards, business regulation, and property rights.
Also, germane to the four perspectives on financial development and growth, some
legal variables are highly significant determinants of growth.  For example, 22 of the 54
regressions produce significant and positive estimates for the legal proxy.  In fact, all six
models for expropriation risk indicate a positive and significant effect, at least within the 10
percent confidence interval.  Also, both enforcement of legal codes and the legal composite
measures produce significant results for all 3- and 6-year averaging periods, but not for 9-
year panels.  The 3- and 9-year models that include the index of bureaucratic efficiencyQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS53 Page 17
produce significant results, but not the corresponding 6-year models.  All models that include
nascent stock markets and the property rights measures produce significant results using all
three averaging periods, but none of the regressions that exclude inconsequential cases
produce significant parameters.  Finally, the index for accounting standards and company
reports is only significant in the 3-year averaging model that includes nascent stock markets.
The creditor, rule of law, and business regulation measures all produce insignificant results.
4.4.  Alternative functional forms
Considering the results thus far, some data indicate that stock market development is
more likely to positively affect growth in higher income cases, but the measures used to
capture more specific aspects of ‘developed’ economies, which might more directly possible
policy proscriptions, do not produce strong econometric relations.  Perhaps, therefore,
alternative functional forms of stock market development itself might produce more robust
results.
Curiously, previous literature seems to exclusively evaluate whether there is a linear
relation between stock market development and growth and does not consider alternative
functional forms.  Given some evidence of differences across initial per capita income levels,
the relation between stock markets and growth is in fact non-linear.  Possibilities include log-
linear, exponential, and quadratic forms.  A log-linear form (and positive coefficient) would
indicate whether the benevolent effect of stock market development decreases for increased
levels of turnover.  An exponential form would suggest that there are increasing returns to
stock market development, and the quadratic form would indicate an optimal level of
development after which the financial system is perhaps ‘unbalanced’ (Beck and Levine,
2000).QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS53 Page 18
Briefly, simple comparison of overall fit (adjusted R
2) should indicate if any
particular function form best conforms to the data.  For example, Table 3 suggests that the
quadratic form for the limited sample fits the data best for long-run models, again perhaps the
most relevant design (adjusted R
2 = 0.3875).  The implied maximum level of turnover to
GDP (approximately 61.31 percent) is within one standard deviation of the sample mean, but
only the linear term is significant within the 10 percent confidence interval.  Similarly, the
quadratic form explain the most variance in the short-run models for the limited sample, but
again, the quadratic term is insignificant (p value of 0.186).
The remaining tests indicate that either the linear or linear-log forms fit the data best,
as each parameter is statistically significant.  The linear form provides the best fits for both
medium-run models, and the linear-log form has the greater adjusted R
2 value for the long-
and short-run models for the expanded data sets that include ‘inconsequential cases’.
5.  Data and Econometric Results: Valuation and Private Investment Growth
The growth regression framework is Section 4 is the most straightforward research
strategy to test whether stock markets have varying real effects depending on the initial level
of national income, but further examination of how the real economy reacts to equity market
prices across different development levels is also instructive.  Put somewhat differently, in
addition of course to examination of (short-run) transmission mechanism (2), if stock markets
have varying effects on growth across income, perhaps the effects of market movements
similarly have distinct effects related to development.
Researchers generally focus on either developed cases (Barro, 1990) or, less
frequently, emerging markets (Henry 2000a, 2000b; Levine and Zervos, 1998b) regarding the
effects of valuation changes on private investment growth.  However, this simultaneously
examines high and low income countries.  Turning to data design, given limitations on WorldQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS53 Page 19
Bank and IFC private investment data, the analyses cover data only 26 countries with annual
observations.  The two criteria for inclusion in the (unbalanced) panel regressions are as
follows.
10  First, any year is included if there are observations from at least 10 countries, and,
second, a country is included if there are at least 10 observations during the resulting period.
Given these criteria, the panel samples cover 1981 through 1998.  The 16 lower income
countries include Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, India, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia,
Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela, and
Zimbabwe.  The 10 developed countries include Australia, Canada, Greece, Japan,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States.
11
Of course, stock market returns are not the only purported determinant of private
investment in either higher or lower income countries.  Unlike the literature on stock market
development and growth, this key issue seems lost on studies of private investment and
valuation in emerging markets.  For example, Henry (2000b) presents several univariate
models that only include either stock market liberalisation dates or stock market returns.
Notably, he never includes both variables simultaneously, and, perhaps more important, he
excludes other country-specific variables that the general literature advances.
12  Therefore, in
addition to contemporaneous and (1-year) lagged valuation changes, every regression in this
study includes lagged real per capita GDP growth rate, the lagged real growth rate in total
private credit, lagged government spending, and lagged foreign exchange reserves to GDP.
13
5.1.  The Complete Sample and Divisions across initial GDP per capita
                                                       
10 While perhaps less desirable, this paper follows the convention in the literature of using unbalanced panel
data sets.
11 Data on stock prices come from the IFS for 16 of the 26 countries.  Data from IFC cover 10 emerging
markets, including Argentina, Brazil, Greece, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Thailand, Turkey, and
Zimbabwe.
12 See Agénor and Montiel (1996) for a discussion of the empirical literature on private investment.
13 Data con all variables ome from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (2000).QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS53 Page 20
As Table 4 indicates, models that include all 26 cases suggest that contemporaneous
valuation changes correlate positively with (real) private investment growth.  The equations
that exclude (Regression 6.1) and include (Regression 6.3) lagged stock price returns both
suggest a positive and safely statistically significant relation.  Both coefficients indicate that
for each one percent level increase in contemporaneous price return, private investment
growth increases by approximately 6.6 percent.
In contrast to previous studies, lagged valuation changes are not robust in the
complete sample.  The coefficients for regressions that both exclude (Regression 6.2) and
include (Regression 6.3) contemporaneous return both produce positive but statistically
insignificant parameter estimates.  Alternative regressions that include contemporaneous
values for real per capita GDP growth rates still indicate that concurrent valuation changes
positively affect private investment growth,
14 but theses aggregate results still do not
unequivocally support the Tobin’s q related mechanism.  That is, without proper instruments,
one cannot be sure that private investment growth, valuation changes, and growth are not
simultaneously determined.
15
Division of the sample is telling.  The regressions that only include the 10 higher
income countries and alternatively control for both contemporaneous and lagged valuation
changes (Regressions 7.2 and 7.3) produce positive and statistically significant coefficients
for both variables.  In fact, the parameter estimate for lagged stock market returns (0.104) is
larger than that for contemporaneous valuation (0.067) in the more complete specification
(Regression 7.3).  Therefore, these data on developed markets generally support the
hypothesis, even given considerably fewer degrees of freedom.
Notably, the regressions that exclusively consider lower income countries indicate
that contemporaneous valuation changes, but importantly not lagged values, affect private
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investment growth.  Both estimates for lagged returns (Regressions 8.2 and 8.3) are positive
and insignificant, but the parameters for current price appreciation (Regressions 8.1 and 8.3)
are safely significant and positive.  Therefore, the division of the sample suggests that
valuation changes are generally more relevant for higher rather than lower income countries.
Moreover, the regressions seem to indicate that the determinants of private investment
growth differ depending roughly on initial national income.  For example, all three
regressions for the developed country sample (Regressions 7.1 through 7.3) all indicate that
the lagged growth rate is a significant determinant, but no other variable is robust within any
standard confidence interval.  On the other hand, models that exclusively examine emerging
markets (Regressions 8.1 through 8.3) indicate that lagged real credit growth and lagged
reserves to GDP help explain private investment growth, but the lagged growth rate is
insignificant.  In short, if the capital accumulation process differs fundamentally across
higher and lower income countries, perhaps the findings on valuation changes is hardly
surprising.  In short, these results suggest cast doubt on the transmission mechanism from
liberalisation to prices to benevolent real effects.
5.2. Interaction with Initial GDP per capita and Country Risk
As similarly discussed in the context of stock market development and economic
growth, division of the sample is somewhat imprecise.  Therefore, this section attempts to
identify whether there are more systematic schisms between lower and higher income
countries that capture the relative salience of the transmission mechanism from valuation to
private investment.  Are there quantitatively measurable preconditions that increase the
elasticity of private investment with respect to stock market behaviour?
Similar to (3), an interaction term might capture such a dynamic, as in
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(4)
Private Investment Growth = α  + β 1RETURNS + β 2[ln(RETURNS× GDP] + β 3X + µ.
The first and simplest such factor is initial per capita GDP, which might more precisely
capture any contingent relation between income and valuation effects.  If β 2 > 0 (and β 1 = 0),
then a given valuation change has a more pronounced effect the greater initial income.
Indeed, as Table 5 suggests, the interaction terms reinforce the findings in the
previous section.  That is, while the interaction term with contemporaneous returns is
insignificant (from Regression 9.1), the model that includes lagged returns (Regression 9.2)
produces a statistically significant and positive interaction term.  Also, notably, the lagged
valuation coefficient is insignificant (and actually negative).  In general, this suggests that the
effect of lagged returns on private investment is largely contingent on initial income.
Second, the link between valuation changes and private investment is conceivably
more pronounced in countries that have more favourable country risk ratings, and the analysis
includes regressions using Institutional Investor’s measures in (4).  As Table 5 indicates, the
results very broadly reflect those of GDP per capita.  That is, the model that includes
contemporaneous returns (Regression 10.1) does not produce a significant interaction term,
but the regression that uses lagged values (Regression 10.2) suggests that the interaction
between lagged returns and lagged country credit has a positive effect on private investment.
Again, while the country risk proxies perhaps capture diverse concepts, this result broadly
suggests that valuation changes affect private investment decisions more profoundly for cases
in which investors generally have a higher degree of confidence.
5.3.  Interactions with Financial Development
As Section 4 discusses, initial income and country risk ratings have little concrete
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more concrete policy references.  For example, one might expect the interaction between
valuation and private investment to be more pronounced in a given country the larger and
more efficient the financial sector, particularly of course with respect to the stock market.
Simply, aggregate valuation changes in countries with large or more liquid markets would
seem to have greater effects on private investment.  Similar to the regressions that include
initial GDP interaction and country risk, the remaining models in Table 5 (Regressions 11.1,
through 13.2) examine stock market liquidity, stock market size, and aggregate ‘financial
activity’
16 (Levine, 2000; Beck and Levine, 2000), respectively, to estimate β 2.
In contrast to this hypothesis, none of these interaction terms, using either
contemporaneous or lagged values, produces a positive interaction between valuation
changes and the initial level of stock market or broader financial development.  Similar to the
previous section, contemporaneous return is positive and significant in the three
specifications (Regressions 11.1, 12.1, and 13.1), irrespective of turnover, size, or financial
activity.  More curious, the interaction between lagged valuation and lagged financial activity
suggests that price appreciation has a more negative impact on valuation the more developed
the financial system (Regression 13.2), but the parameter is only significant within the 10
percent confidence interval.
5.4.  Interactions with Legal Proxies
The remainder of Table 5 examines interaction terms with legal variables.  Briefly,
corporate managers quite conceivably link investment decisions to share prices more directly
in cases with more developed and secure legal systems.  But the legal proxies do not clearly
support this perspective or consistently explain more variance than initial income or the broad
country risk measure.
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For example, seven of the interaction terms and legal proxies – the creditor codes,
enforcement, legal composite, rule of law, expropriation risk, bureaucratic efficiency, and
property rights – produce insignificant results.  Moreover, the remaining two variables
curiously produce insignificant results.  The regression (Regression 16) that includes the
measure of accounting and company report standards supports the hypothesis, as the
interaction term is positive and statistically significant.  However, the interaction term with
the index of business regulation (Regression 21) produces a perverse and negative result, and
the coefficient for the legal proxy itself is negative and significant, at least within the 10
percent confidence interval (p value = 0.097).
Therefore, all in all, these data on private investment strongly suggest that lagged
valuation changes affect private investment in more developed areas.  But, the econometric
results cannot identify any specific factor associated with higher income, as neither financial
nor legal variables seem to be contingent factors.
5.4.  Does Stock Market Liberalisation Directly Boost Private Investment?
Again, recently published research suggest that stock market liberalisation boosts
private investment, as liberalisation increases prices which in turn boosts private investment
via the Tobin’s q related mechanism in (2) (the reduction in the cost of equity capital).
However, subsequent sensitivity analysis on the first stage of the transmission mechanism
(Durham, 2000b) casts doubt on the relation.  The apparent positive effect on valuation is
highly sensitive to alternative dates for the critical liberalisation event, and the statistical
relation is robust given time-series rather than pooled regressions.  Also, extreme bound
analysis of stock market returns in emerging markets indicates that the positive relation is not
robust when the right hand side includes other variables that supposedly correlate with
valuation.  Moreover, with respect to the final phase of the transmission mechanism, theQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS53 Page 25
results in this section do not indicate that past price appreciation leads to greater private
investment in lower income countries.
These critical questions aside, previous research that suggests liberalisation effects
private investment does not persuasively show that reform has a positive direct effect on the
dependent variable.  More specifically, published research (Henry 2000a, 2000b) does not
include models that control for liberalisation and valuation simultaneously, nor do these
results control for other factors in the general literature on private investment, including the
variables used in previous sections.
Therefore, this section briefly examines the direct effect of liberalisation on private
investment, using the contemporaneous value as well as the first and second lead values to
examined lagged effects of reform, following previous literature (Henry, 2000b).  All
regressions summarised in Table 6 control for contemporaneous and lagged returns, lagged
growth, lagged real credit growth, lagged government spending, and lagged reserves to GDP.
None of specifications, using any of the alternative liberalisation dates, produces a
statistically significant and positive result in the sample of 16 lower income countries.  The
dating conventions used in Henry (2000a, 2000b) and Levine and Zervos (1998b) produce no
significant estimates.  Also, the results using dates from Bekaert and Harvey (1998) as well
as Kim and Singal (1999) actually suggest that private investment growth decreases in the
year following reform (Regressions 23.05 and 23.08, respectively).  Therefore, besides the
ambiguous effects of reform on prices and prices on investment, stock market liberalisation
does not seem to have a direct benevolent effect on private investment growth.
Conclusions
This paper examines both long- and short-run hypotheses regarding the effects of
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growth and private investment, in lower income countries.  In addition to the noteworthy
experience of emerging markets from 1994 through 1998, there are several reasons to re-
examine these hypotheses.  Most generally, considerable research on a variety of variables
that purport to explain macroeconomic performance suggests that results differ considerably
across lower, middle, and higher income countries.  More specific to this research question,
some data also indicate the stock markets differ considerably in emerging and developed
markets both with respect to ‘microstructure’ and return factors.
Indeed, the results in this paper seem to indicate that stock market behaviour has
varying real effects depending on the initial level of income.  With respect to growth and
equity market development, the long-run model suggests that higher income countries drive
the overall positive relation.  Also, interaction terms with initial GDP and country credit
ratings are largely positive and significant, and a few legal variables are also robust.  The
econometrics on private investment produces more lucid results.  Lagged valuation changes
clearly affect private investment decisions in higher but not lower income countries.
Statistical interactions with initial GDP and country credit are significant, but curiously,
neither financial development nor legal related variables seem to be key intervening factors.
Therefore, further research into what aspect of development, more specifically,
mitigates the real effects of stock market behaviour would be instructive.  Meanwhile, both
long- and short-run transmission mechanisms from stock market liberalisation to desirable
macroeconomic performance seem somewhat questionable in the context of lower income
countries.  There is very little evidence of detrimental effects, even extending the sample
through 1998, but the positive impacts are not imminently clear.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS53 Page 27
Table 1: Stock Market Development (Liquidity) and Growth, Sample Divisions, 1981 to 1998
Regression (9 year averaging) 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
Observations 74 117 37 37 80
C o u n t r i e s 4 16 41 92 24 5
R
2 0.444 0.396 0.758 0.509 0.392
Sample Income Total Total High Low Low
‘Inconsequential’ Included? No Yes No No Yes
Estimation Method OLS, Robust OLS, Robust OLS, Robust OLS, Robust OLS, Robust
β p value β p value β p value β p value β p value
Lagged Turnover 0.017 0.100 0.031 0.007 0.027 0.005 0.006 0.704 0.022 0.169
Lagged Bank Credit -0.006 0.236 -0.010 0.077 -0.012 0.001 0.003 0.685 -0.008 0.460
Initial GDP per capita -0.673 0.090 0.132 0.758 -0.320 0.561 -1.586 0.008 -0.238 0.656
Investment Ratio 0.173 0.000 0.106 0.005 0.139 0.000 0.137 0.162 0.087 0.006
Population Growth -0.873 0.002 -0.636 0.031 -0.193 0.271 -1.203 0.029 -0.642 0.196
Lagged Education Rate 0.196 0.293 0.139 0.483 -0.108 0.197 1.107 0.119 1.215 0.022
Dummy for 1981-1989 -0.190 0.637 -0.359 0.334 0.336 0.204 -0.018 0.981 -0.482 0.384
Intercept 4.424 0.156 -1.296 0.707 2.560 0.626 11.460 0.008 0.861 0.839
Regression (6 year averaging) 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5
Observations 128 188 59 69 129
C o u n t r i e s 5 37 22 23 15 0
R
2 0.418 0.367 0.322 0.489 0.371
Sample Income Total Total High Low Low
‘Inconsequential’ Included? No Yes No No Yes
Estimation Method GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS
β p value β p value β p value β p value β p value
Lagged Turnover 0.016 0.026 0.024 0.006 0.018 0.165 0.014 0.183 0.022 0.052
Lagged Bank Credit -0.001 0.900 -0.004 0.456 -0.006 0.172 0.004 0.645 -0.002 0.804
Initial GDP per capita -0.918 0.005 -0.278 0.425 -1.160 0.178 -1.468 0.004 -0.539 0.266
Investment Ratio 0.189 0.000 0.128 0.000 0.121 0.001 0.212 0.000 0.118 0.000
Population Growth -0.989 0.000 -0.708 0.007 -0.294 0.292 -1.097 0.006 -0.544 0.162
Lagged Education Rate 0.193 0.342 0.244 0.368 -0.020 0.917 0.270 0.613 0.996 0.084
Dummy for 1981-1986 -0.822 0.047 -0.958 0.016 -0.766 0.089 -0.871 0.234 -1.000 0.089
Dummy for 1987-1992 -0.209 0.582 -0.553 0.142 -0.358 0.374 -0.178 0.779 -0.672 0.215
Intercept 6.135 0.028 1.462 0.596 10.730 0.168 9.708 0.022 2.433 0.511QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS53 Page 28
Table 1 (continued)
Regression (3 year averaging) 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5
Observations 270 394 121 149 273
C o u n t r i e s 6 17 82 33 85 5
R
2 0.325 0.251 0.419 0.337 0.260
Sample Income Total Total High Low Low
‘Inconsequential’ Included? No Yes No No Yes
Estimation Method GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS
β p value β p value β p value β p value β p value
Lagged Turnover 0.018 0.002 0.025 0.000 0.020 0.006 0.020 0.046 0.033 0.001
Lagged Bank Credit -0.005 0.227 -0.006 0.136 -0.012 0.003 0.000 0.962 -0.001 0.796
Initial GDP per capita -0.955 0.001 0.049 0.858 -0.462 0.582 -1.566 0.001 -0.127 0.733
Investment Ratio 0.200 0.000 0.132 0.000 0.197 0.000 0.193 0.000 0.111 0.000
Population Growth -1.048 0.000 -0.309 0.081 -1.007 0.000 -0.892 0.008 0.079 0.738
Lagged Education Rate 0.188 0.315 0.199 0.362 -0.121 0.540 0.352 0.412 0.868 0.040
Dummy for 1981-1983 -1.129 0.043 -1.889 0.001 -1.560 0.014 -0.963 0.298 -2.183 0.004
Dummy for 1984-1986 0.148 0.782 -0.196 0.722 0.071 0.906 0.003 0.997 -0.516 0.489
Dummy for 1987-1989 0.271 0.596 -0.412 0.446 0.461 0.432 -0.152 0.852 -0.959 0.191
Dummy for 1990-1992 -0.211 0.682 -1.039 0.054 -1.112 0.051 0.345 0.673 -1.070 0.140
Dummy for 1993-1995 0.460 0.336 -0.018 0.972 0.434 0.439 0.528 0.470 -0.198 0.778
Intercept 6.229 0.013 -1.735 0.410 3.623 0.634 10.271 0.008 -1.666 0.546QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS53 Page 29
Table 2A: GDP per capita Interaction Terms, 1981 to 1998
Regression 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6
Observations 74 117 128 188 270 394
C a s e s 4 16 45 37 26 17 8
Averaging Period 9 years 9 years 6 years 6 years 3 years 3 years
R
2 0.447 0.416 0.408 0.381 0.326 0.262
Sample Income Total Total Total Total Total Total
‘Inconsequential’ Included? No Yes No Yes No Yes
Estimation Method OLS, Robust OLS, Robust GLS GLS GLS GLS
β p value β p value β p value β p value β p value β p value
Lagged Turnover 0.008 0.675 0.016 0.108 0.018 0.128 0.015 0.117 0.015 0.055 0.017 0.022
Lagged Turnover GDP interaction 0.194 0.569 0.109 0.072 -0.055 0.816 0.121 0.044 0.085 0.610 0.117 0.017
Lagged Bank Credit -0.006 0.230 -0.011 0.044 0.000 0.920 -0.004 0.384 -0.005 0.220 -0.006 0.126
Initial GDP per capita -0.920 0.168 -0.149 0.721 -0.837 0.072 -0.640 0.101 -1.063 0.004 -0.312 0.315
Investment Ratio 0.175 0.000 0.107 0.003 0.188 0.000 0.127 0.000 0.201 0.000 0.130 0.000
Population Growth -0.902 0.003 -0.618 0.035 -0.980 0.000 -0.697 0.007 -1.049 0.000 -0.314 0.073
Lagged Education Rate 0.213 0.266 0.155 0.435 0.189 0.352 0.245 0.356 0.187 0.319 0.190 0.381
Dummy for 1981-1989 -0.182 0.654 -0.383 0.303
Dummy for 1981-1986 -0.816 0.050 -0.880 0.027
Dummy for 1987-1992 -0.217 0.572 -0.513 0.172
Dummy for 1981-1983 -1.140 0.041 -1.801 0.001
Dummy for 1984-1986 0.151 0.777 -0.112 0.838
Dummy for 1987-1989 0.275 0.591 -0.379 0.481
Dummy for 1990-1992 -0.232 0.654 -0.991 0.065
Dummy for 1993-1995 0.453 0.344 -0.026 0.960
Intercept 4.517 0.157 0.430 0.897 6.021 0.032 3.633 0.215 6.288 0.012 0.469 0.837QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS53 Page 30
Table 2B: Country Credit Ratings Interaction Terms, 1981 to 1998
Regression 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6
Observations 74 117 127 187 269 393
C a s e s 4 16 45 27 26 17 8
Averaging Period 9 years 9 years 6 years 6 years 3 years 3 years
R
2 0.448 0.419 0.419 0.318 0.329 0.264
Sample Income Total Total Total Total Total Total
‘Inconsequential’ Included? No Yes No Yes No Yes
Estimation Method OLS, Robust OLS, Robust GLS GLS GLS GLS
β p value β p value β p value β p value β p value β p value
Lagged Turnover 0.007 0.633 0.011 0.316 0.013 0.247 0.012 0.252 0.011 0.172 0.013 0.102
Lagged Turnover Country Credit interaction 0.189 0.450 0.204 0.051 0.065 0.750 0.201 0.059 0.204 0.241 0.224 0.008
Lagged Bank Credit -0.005 0.235 -0.011 0.043 0.000 0.984 -0.004 0.360 -0.006 0.172 -0.006 0.108
Initial GDP per capita -0.795 0.076 -0.147 0.723 -1.000 0.007 -0.591 0.124 -1.074 0.001 -0.310 0.309
Investment Ratio 0.174 0.000 0.106 0.003 0.189 0.000 0.127 0.000 0.199 0.000 0.130 0.000
Population Growth -0.891 0.002 -0.617 0.035 -1.006 0.000 -0.698 0.007 -1.039 0.000 -0.310 0.078
Lagged Education Rate 0.207 0.277 0.158 0.429 0.199 0.338 0.235 0.375 0.174 0.354 0.175 0.418
Dummy for 1981-1989 -0.258 0.501 -0.432 0.252
Dummy for 1981-1986 -0.826 0.056 -0.942 0.019
Dummy for 1987-1992 -0.180 0.640 -0.520 0.171
Dummy for 1981-1983 -1.203 0.032 -1.838 0.001
Dummy for 1984-1986 0.149 0.781 -0.112 0.838
Dummy for 1987-1989 0.298 0.561 -0.361 0.503
Dummy for 1990-1992 -0.232 0.653 -0.984 0.067
Dummy for 1993-1995 0.508 0.290 0.020 0.970
Intercept 4.449 0.157 0.437 0.895 6.443 0.024 3.368 0.247 6.199 0.013 0.465 0.837QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS53 Page 31
Table 2C: Legal Indicators Interaction Terms, 1981 to 1998
Lagged Turnover Interaction Legal Indicator Averaging
Legal Index: β 1 p value β 2 p value β 3 p value R
2 Obs. Period
Creditor -0.009 0.457 0.537 0.021 -0.093 0.659 0.541 59 9 No
Creditor -0.012 0.293 0.606 0.001 -0.179 0.317 0.556 66 9 Yes
Creditor 0.003 0.732 0.373 0.140 0.120 0.691 0.478 95 6 No
Creditor 0.001 0.887 0.420 0.049 0.042 0.866 0.487 104 6 Yes
Creditor 0.003 0.735 0.327 0.179 0.130 0.655 0.375 196 3 No
Creditor 0.001 0.924 0.384 0.061 0.052 0.828 0.374 213 3 Yes
Enforce -0.013 0.314 0.561 0.052 0.397 0.170 0.525 61 9 No
Enforce -0.001 0.931 0.237 0.177 0.280 0.151 0.501 68 9 Yes
Enforce 0.009 0.562 0.130 0.695 0.521 0.018 0.479 98 6 No
Enforce 0.010 0.396 0.033 0.852 0.388 0.056 0.468 107 6 Yes
Enforce 0.006 0.550 0.241 0.388 0.513 0.012 0.369 202 3 No
Enforce 0.009 0.261 0.070 0.643 0.398 0.026 0.358 219 3 Yes
Account -0.013 0.354 0.440 0.179 0.004 0.867 0.453 58 9 No
Account 0.005 0.707 -0.027 0.916 0.016 0.507 0.420 60 9 Yes
Account 0.014 0.415 -0.201 0.624 0.035 0.147 0.447 91 6 No
Account 0.015 0.225 -0.255 0.229 0.036 0.112 0.443 94 6 Yes
Account 0.008 0.457 -0.006 0.985 0.029 0.163 0.366 186 3 No
Account 0.012 0.151 -0.195 0.281 0.033 0.099 0.355 192 3 Yes
Legal Composite 0.007 0.456 -0.099 0.661 0.724 0.127 0.456 56 9 No
Legal Composite 0.004 0.703 -0.057 0.791 0.588 0.160 0.427 58 9 Yes
Legal Composite 0.015 0.117 -0.468 0.075 1.416 0.001 0.488 88 6 No
Legal Composite 0.010 0.281 -0.412 0.132 1.218 0.005 0.459 91 6 Yes
Legal Composite 0.010 0.143 -0.242 0.310 1.185 0.003 0.402 180 3 No
Legal Composite 0.008 0.277 -0.204 0.410 1.033 0.009 0.380 186 3 YesQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS53 Page 32
Table 2C (continued)
Lagged Turnover Interaction Legal Indicator Averaging
Legal Index: β 1 p value β 2 p value β 3 p value R
2 Obs. Period
Rule of Law -0.015 0.309 0.583 0.065 0.103 0.571 0.493 61 9 No
Rule of Law -0.003 0.815 0.255 0.156 0.056 0.616 0.481 68 9 Yes
Rule of Law 0.006 0.708 0.184 0.588 0.234 0.167 0.459 98 6 No
Rule of Law 0.008 0.542 0.073 0.699 0.145 0.310 0.453 107 6 Yes
Rule of Law 0.005 0.612 0.261 0.349 0.211 0.159 0.354 202 3 No
Rule of Law 0.008 0.360 0.099 0.532 0.141 0.257 0.347 219 3 Yes
Expropriation Risk -0.021 0.087 0.509 0.057 0.713 0.070 0.572 61 9 No
Expropriation Risk -0.005 0.664 0.173 0.304 0.592 0.064 0.536 68 9 Yes
Expropriation Risk 0.009 0.558 -0.007 0.983 0.844 0.001 0.502 98 6 No
Expropriation Risk 0.011 0.353 -0.066 0.695 0.715 0.006 0.491 107 6 Yes
Expropriation Risk 0.006 0.541 0.103 0.711 0.877 0.001 0.385 202 3 No
Expropriation Risk 0.010 0.230 -0.039 0.790 0.765 0.001 0.374 219 3 Yes
Bureaucracy Efficiency -0.014 0.218 0.574 0.047 0.230 0.073 0.520 61 9 No
Bureaucracy Efficiency -0.009 0.414 0.438 0.047 0.253 0.044 0.518 62 9 Yes
Bureaucracy Efficiency 0.008 0.644 0.148 0.677 0.224 0.177 0.452 97 6 No
Bureaucracy Efficiency 0.012 0.440 0.022 0.943 0.246 0.138 0.454 98 6 Yes
Bureaucracy Efficiency 0.005 0.609 0.287 0.319 0.286 0.050 0.357 199 3 No
Bureaucracy Efficiency 0.009 0.374 0.152 0.541 0.313 0.030 0.356 201 3 Yes
Business Regulation 0.014 0.497 0.049 0.895 0.222 0.496 0.294 65 9 No
Business Regulation 0.004 0.761 0.268 0.206 0.272 0.445 0.344 88 9 Yes
Business Regulation 0.016 0.291 -0.019 0.944 0.289 0.437 0.362 108 6 No
Business Regulation 0.006 0.709 0.175 0.437 0.540 0.189 0.379 140 6 Yes
Business Regulation 0.012 0.226 0.108 0.636 0.277 0.351 0.285 223 3 No
Business Regulation 0.005 0.624 0.197 0.260 0.474 0.162 0.330 290 3 Yes
Property Rights 0.015 0.469 0.011 0.976 0.433 0.135 0.308 65 9 No
Property Rights 0.005 0.716 0.206 0.321 0.607 0.024 0.369 88 9 Yes
Property Rights 0.019 0.230 -0.086 0.762 0.468 0.242 0.370 108 6 No
Property Rights 0.008 0.609 0.118 0.574 0.711 0.050 0.400 140 6 Yes
Property Rights 0.012 0.213 0.075 0.749 0.286 0.367 0.285 223 3 No
Property Rights 0.006 0.546 0.134 0.418 0.616 0.041 0.338 290 3 YesQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS53 Page 33
Table 3: Alternative Functional Forms, Liquidity and Growth, 1981-1998
Averaging ‘Inconsequential’ Max
Period Included? Functional Form: R
2 β 1 p value β 2 p value Turnover
9 year No Linear 0.3848 0.017 0.084
9 year No Linear-Log 0.3862 0.315 0.077
9 year No Third Degree 0.3595 7.29E-07 0.609
9 year No Second Degree 0.3678 1.36E-04 0.287
9 year No Quadratic 0.3875 -3.35E-04 0.256 0.041 0.078 61.307
6 year No Linear 0.3790 0.016 0.022
6 year No Linear-Log 0.3664 0.238 0.095
6 year No Third Degree 0.3653 7.39E-07 0.108
6 year No Second Degree 0.3732 1.27E-04 0.042
6 year No Quadratic 0.3737 -6.09E-06 0.966 0.017 0.295 1379.951
3 year No Linear 0.2962 0.018 0.002
3 year No Linear-Log 0.2896 0.373 0.009
3 year No Third Degree 0.2768 3.62E-07 0.138
3 year No Second Degree 0.2833 8.83E-05 0.032
3 year No Quadratic 0.2982 -1.22E-04 0.186 0.034 0.011 139.849
9 year Yes Linear 0.3568 0.031 0.009
9 year Yes Linear-Log 0.3735 0.484 0.002
9 year Yes Third Degree 0.3255 2.15E-06 0.234
9 year Yes Second Degree 0.3351 2.78E-04 0.082
9 year Yes Quadratic 0.3597 -4.24E-04 0.221 0.059 0.023 69.308
6 year Yes Linear 0.3414 0.027 0.001
6 year Yes Linear-Log 0.3349 0.422 0.002
6 year Yes Third Degree 0.3277 1.44E-06 0.007
6 year Yes Second Degree 0.3353 2.22E-04 0.002
6 year Yes Quadratic 0.3378 3.31E-05 0.839 0.024 0.195 -355.415
3 year Yes Linear 0.2297 0.025 0.000
3 year Yes Linear-Log 0.2315 0.507 0.000
3 year Yes Third Degree 0.2097 5.64E-07 0.056
3 year Yes Second Degree 0.2166 1.31E-04 0.008
3 year Yes Quadratic 0.2313 -1.45E-04 0.178 0.043 0.004 149.448QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS53 Page 34
Table 4: Private Investment Regressions (GLS), 1981-1998, Sample Divisions
Regression 6.1 6.2 6.3
Observations 403 404 400
C a s e s 2 62 62 6
R
2 0.339 0.304 0.341
Sample Income Total Total Total
β p value β p value β p value
Real Return 0.066 0.000 0.066 0.000
Lagged Real Return 0.015 0.302 0.019 0.199
Lagged Growth Rate 0.005 0.031 0.004 0.109 0.005 0.029
Lagged Real Credit Growth Rate 0.289 0.000 0.301 0.000 0.281 0.000
Lagged Government Spending 0.000 0.840 -0.001 0.604 0.000 0.946
Lagged Reserves to GDP 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.002
Intercept -0.095 0.108 -0.104 0.083 -0.097 0.100
Regression 7.1 7.2 7.3
Observations 147 149 147
C a s e s 1 01 01 0
R
2 0.429 0.450 0.476
Sample Income High High High
β p value β p value β p value
Real Return 0.050 0.122 0.067 0.036
Lagged Real Return 0.095 0.003 0.104 0.001
Lagged Growth Rate 0.015 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.016 0.000
Lagged Real Credit Growth Rate 0.024 0.683 0.042 0.467 0.052 0.363
Lagged Government Spending 0.001 0.632 0.001 0.691 0.001 0.543
Lagged Reserves to GDP 0.000 0.830 0.000 0.999 0.000 0.793
Intercept 0.051 0.502 0.003 0.966 0.016 0.834QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS53 Page 35
Table 4 (continued)
Regression 8.1 8.2 8.3
Observations 256 255 253
C a s e s 1 61 61 6
R
2 0.364 0.336 0.363
Sample Income Low Low Low
β p value β p value β p value
Real Return 0.058 0.002 0.058 0.002
Lagged Real Return 0.003 0.889 0.008 0.674
Lagged Growth Rate 0.002 0.517 0.000 0.873 0.002 0.501
Lagged Real Credit Growth Rate 0.357 0.000 0.383 0.000 0.352 0.000
Lagged Government Spending -0.002 0.623 -0.005 0.336 -0.002 0.704
Lagged Reserves to GDP 0.005 0.009 0.005 0.012 0.005 0.009
Intercept -0.067 0.429 -0.054 0.537 -0.073 0.400QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS53 Page 36
Table 5: Private Investment Regressions: Interaction Terms, 1981-1998
(GDP per capita and Country Credit)
Regression 9.1 9.2 10.1 10.2
Observations 401 404 403 404
C a s e s 2 62 62 62 6
R
2 0.342 0.325 0.339 0.312
Sample Income Total Total Total Total
β p value β p value β p value β p value
Real Return 0.062 0.000 0.065 0.000
Lagged Real Return -0.015 0.343 -0.004 0.812
Valuation ×  GDP 0.001 0.662
Lagged Valuation ×  GDP 0.011 0.000
Valuation ×  Country Credit 0.001 0.869
Lagged Valuation ×  Country Credit 0.016 0.038
Real GDP per capita 0.000 0.773
Lagged Real GDP per capita 0.000 0.059
Country Credit 0.000 0.674
Lagged Country Credit -0.001 0.171
Lagged Growth Rate 0.005 0.046 0.003 0.157 0.005 0.036 0.004 0.127
Lagged Real Credit Growth Rate 0.285 0.000 0.275 0.000 0.284 0.000 0.294 0.000
Lagged Government Spending -0.001 0.758 0.000 0.878 0.000 0.859 -0.001 0.704
Lagged Reserves to GDP 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.033 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.010
Intercept -0.054 0.406 -0.099 0.150 -0.111 0.109 -0.072 0.334QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS53 Page 37
Table 5 (continued)
Financial Development Indicators: Turnover, Market Capitalisation, Financial Activity
Regression 11.1 11.2 12.1 12.2 13.1 13.2
Observations 396 394 399 398 393 396
C a s e s 2 62 62 62 62 62 6
R
2 0.343 0.311 0.342 0.316 0.353 0.326
Sample Income Total Total Total Total Total Total
β p value β p value β p value β p value β p value β p value
Real Return 0.074 0.000 0.065 0.000 0.065 0.000
Lagged Real Return 0.012 0.461 0.001 0.927 0.017 0.263
Valuation ×  Turnover -0.009 0.279
Lagged Valuation ×  Turnover 0.000 0.955
Valuation ×  Market Size 0.002 0.805
Lagged Valuation ×  Market Size 0.012 0.136
Valuation×   Financial Activity -0.008 0.401
Lagged Valuation ×  Financial Activity -0.019 0.053
Turnover 0.000 0.560
Lagged Turnover 0.000 0.556
Market Size 0.000 0.489
Lagged Market Size 0.000 0.318
Financial Activity -0.009 0.138
Lagged Financial Activity -0.015 0.018
Lagged Growth Rate 0.005 0.035 0.004 0.130 0.005 0.033 0.004 0.086 0.005 0.035 0.005 0.033
Lagged Real Credit Growth Rate 0.289 0.000 0.310 0.000 0.292 0.000 0.287 0.000 0.307 0.000 0.299 0.000
Lagged Government Spending -0.001 0.708 -0.002 0.475 -0.001 0.707 -0.002 0.478 0.000 0.848 -0.001 0.704
Lagged Reserves to GDP 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.005 0.001 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.005 0.001
Intercept -0.095 0.134 -0.112 0.087 -0.089 0.133 -0.108 0.085 -0.046 0.490 -0.030 0.658QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS53 Page 38
 Table 5 (continued)
(Legal Proxies: Creditor, Enforcement, Accounting Standards, Legal Composite)
Regression 14 15 16 17
Observations 363 379 348 332
Cases 23 24 22 21
R
2 0.389 0.356 0.408 0.430
Sample Income
β p value β p value β p value β p value
Lagged Real Return 0.017 0.230 0.022 0.139 -0.008 0.619 0.005 0.730
Lagged Valuation× Creditor -0.013 0.251
Creditor -0.013 0.292
Lagged Valuation× Enforce -0.006 0.503
Enforce -0.005 0.506
Lagged Valuation× Account 0.019 0.009
Account 0.001 0.528
Lagged Valuation× Legal Composite -0.009 0.198
Legal Composite -0.023 0.475
Lagged Growth Rate 0.007 0.004 0.007 0.004 0.009 0.000 0.012 0.000
Lagged Real Credit Growth Rate 0.342 0.000 0.303 0.000 0.313 0.000 0.275 0.000
Lagged Government Spending 0.001 0.653 0.001 0.766 -0.003 0.353 0.003 0.461
Lagged Reserves to GDP 0.003 0.034 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.136
Intercept -0.156 0.017 -0.103 0.151 -0.189 0.059 -0.215 0.019QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS53 Page 39
Table 5 (continued)
(Legal Proxies: Rule of Law, Expropriation Risk, Bureaucratic Efficiency, Business Regulation, Property Rights)
Regression 18 19 20 21 22
Observations 379 379 379 379 379
C a s e s 2 42 42 42 4 2 4
R
2 0.358 0.355 0.355 0.366 0.358
Sample Income
β p value β p value β p value β p value β p value
Lagged Real Return 0.023 0.123 0.021 0.161 0.021 0.160 0.022 0.134 0.022 0.127
Lagged Valuation× Rule of Law -0.009 0.343
Rule of Law -0.006 0.297
Lagged Valuation× Expropiration Risk -0.004 0.709
Expropriation Risk -0.004 0.681
Lagged Valuation× Bureuacratic Efficiency -0.005 0.598
Bureaucratic Efficiency 0.003 0.571
Lagged Valuation× Business Regulation -0.018 0.041
Business Regulation -0.025 0.097
Lagged Valuation× Property Rights -0.014 0.132
Property Rights 0.002 0.904
Lagged Growth Rate 0.007 0.003 0.007 0.004 0.007 0.004 0.007 0.004 0.007 0.004
Lagged Real Credit Growth Rate 0.299 0.000 0.304 0.000 0.299 0.000 0.299 0.000 0.297 0.000
Lagged Government Spending 0.001 0.663 0.000 0.857 0.000 0.968 0.000 0.959 0.000 0.935
Lagged Reserves to GDP 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.005 0.001 0.004 0.002
Intercept -0.109 0.092 -0.101 0.251 -0.141 0.035 -0.050 0.524 -0.137 0.115QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS53 Page 40
Table 6: Stock Market Liberalisation and Private Investment Growth
17
Regression Liberalisation Proxy β p value R
2 Obs.
23.01 Liberalisation (Henry, 2000) -0.108 0.129 0.369 253
23.02 Post Liberalisation (1 year) (Henry, 2000) -0.092 0.189 0.388 240
23.03 Post Liberalisation (2 year) (Henry, 2000) 0.080 0.245 0.418 225
23.04 Liberalisation (Bekaert and Harvey, 1998) -0.028 0.669 0.363 253
23.05 Post Liberalisation (1 year) (Bekaert and Harvey, 1998) -0.149 0.010 0.402 240
23.06 Post Liberalisation (2 year) (Bekaert and Harvey, 1998) 0.007 0.904 0.414 225
23.07 Liberalisation (Kim and Singal, 1999) -0.047 0.511 0.364 253
23.08 Post Liberalisation (1 year) (Kim and Singal, 1999) -0.148 0.029 0.397 240
23.09 Post Liberalisation (2 year) (Kim and Singal, 1999) 0.008 0.898 0.414 225
23.10 Liberalisation (Levine and Zervos, 1998b) 0.015 0.814 0.363 253
23.11 Post Liberalisation (1 year) (Levine and Zervos, 1998b) -0.072 0.289 0.387 240
23.12 Post Liberalisation (2 year) (Levine and Zervos, 1998b) -0.091 0.190 0.419 225
                                                       
17 All regressions include the contemporaneous and lagged valuation changes as well as standard control variables.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS53 Page 41
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